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Abstract  
There have been a number of studies conducted in relation to data remaining on disks purchased on the second 
hand market. A large number of these studies have indicated that a proportion of these disks contain a degree of 
residual data placed on the drive by the original owners. The Security Research Centre at BT has sponsored a 
residual data study over the last five years examining disks sourced around the globe, in the UK, USA, Germany 
France and Australia. In 2008 as part of a 5 year study, Glamorgan University in conjunction with Edith Cowan 
University in Australia, Longwood University in Virginia USA and the BT Security Research Centre completed 
the fourth annual disk study aimed at assessing the volume and nature of information that remains on computer 
hard disks offered for sale on the second hand market. One of the main findings of the study was the high 
proportion of disks that are sold in a non-functioning state. As in both previous and following years a 
percentage of the hard disks examined in the 2008 study failed the imaging process and were marked as faulty. 
This paper describes further analysis of a number of these faulty drives from the UK sample set of the 2008 
study. This paper details the analysis of non-functioning disks supplied to the University of Glamorgan to 
determine the ease with which data can be recovered from these drives using specialist recovery tools. It 
discusses implications for both computer forensics and information security practices and procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There are numerous studies examining the way in which data can be recovered from computer hard disks for 
which the correct disposal action has not been taken (Garfinkel (2003), Sutherland (2006). During the last three 
years the University of Glamorgan in conjunction with Edith Cowan University in Australia, Longwood 
University in the USA and BT, has participated in a study of the data that remained on second hand hard disks 
(Jones et al, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010). The disk study project had been conducted in order to obtain an 
understanding of the amounts and types of information that remained on disks that had been offered for sale on 
the second hand market through various channels including online auctions.  
   
The methodology employed for the disk study involved the purchase of a sample set of disks, in the case of the 
UK set in 2008 this was in the order of 133 disks, obtained from computer fairs, computer auctions or via online 
auction sites. The disks were purchased individually or in small batches, discretely obtained by a number of 
buyers.  These disks were acquired by the project sponsor British Telecommunications (BT) Limited. The disks 
were a mixture of the form factors (the 3.5 inch desktop or 2.5 inch laptop drives) although a few smaller 
versions commonly used in devices such as the Apple iPod were also present in the sample. The disks were then 
supplied ‘blind’ to the researchers responsible for the imaging and analysis with no indication of where they had 
been sourced and identified only by a manufacturers label and a unique sequential serial number.  
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In the disk study, the disk drives were forensically analysed with the objective of determining whether the disks 
had been effectively cleansed of data or whether they still contained information that was either visible or easily 
recoverable, and if there was sufficient information to identify an organisation or individual. The research to date 
has indicated that a large proportion of the disks examined that could be accessed, still contained information 
pertaining to a previous owner of the disk. The information recovered could be considered of a sensitive nature 
to the original organisation or individual. The analysis used standard forensic good practice procedures as 
defined in the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based 
Electronic Evidence45. Analysis was performed on a forensic copy of the drive, with the original disk being 
securely stored. The analysis methods used standard commercial tools and depending on the disk recovered 
information either from a file system remaining on the drive or from unallocated space by methods such as data 
carving. 
 
The 2008 research also highlighted that a number of the disks failed during the imaging process; of the 133 disks 
analysed at Glamorgan for the 2008 disk study a total of 57 disks (44.19%) of the disks were faulty in some way. 
The figure of 57 disks does not include those that successfully imaged, but with a high rate of errors, which 
would be replaced with zeros in the image. The figure of 57 disks represents the number that failed to complete 
the imaging process using either Encase or FTK Imager, the main commercial forensic tools in use in the 
University of Glamorgan Forensics Laboratory. Prior to discussing the analysis and recovery of some these disks 
and considering the implications to computer forensics we outline some of the key features of hard disk 
technology and possible failures. 
 
HARD DISK TECHNOLOGY 
 
The hard disk remains the most popular form of digital storage media used in computer systems. The disk drive 
may be housed either within the system unit, a removable caddy or an external housing connected by either 
Firewire or USB.  Current conventional computer hard disks are electro-mechanical devices. In addition to the 
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) the drive contains a number of moving parts: one or more metal, ceramic or glass 
platters coated with a magnetic thin film oxide (the data storage area within the disk), voice coils, motor, 
mountings and an armature with a separate head assembly for each disk surface. A specific sector (the smallest 
addressable unit) can be addressed by using the cylinder address (C) the Head (H) and the Sector (S). These 
mechanical components interact with very small tolerances and consequently are susceptible to damage from 
sudden movements, for instance the type of shock that occurs when a disk is dropped, even a relatively short 
distance. Some of the latest generation of disks contain integrated sensors on the PCB that detect sudden 
movements and automatically park the read/write heads in the event of an accidental fall. Once the heads are in 
the parked position some disks are rated to withstand shocks of up to 350G (Maxtor DiamondMax 20). Disks are 
therefore surprising robust in some cases but fragile in other cases. 
 
Work conducted by Schroeder & Gibson (2007) suggested that disk independent factors in the form of operating 
conditions, usage and environmental factors affect the rate of failure rather than component failures resulting 
from the use of different types of disks, a conclusion supported by Pinheiro (2007). Problems may result from 
either mechanical or chemical failure, common issues highlighted in table 1 below. 
 
Failure Class Example 
Failure 
Description  
Mechanical 
failures 
Spindle jam This may result due to wear and tear on a pre-existing manufacturing 
defect – Semi-defective spindle bearing. 
 Head crash Insufficient airflow to maintain an air bearing between the head and the 
disk platter. This can occur due to a high impact during operation or a 
power failure. This can commonly occur as the disk powers down and 
result in the head failing to part correctly 
Physical damage Impact/ Shock Incorrect handling and storage can cause damage to the disk. Physical 
damage to the circuit board can also result from a harsh working 
environment (Schroeder 2005) 
 Disk 
contamination 
Disks operate using very fine tolerances. The disk head travels over the 
surface of the drive at a distance of 0.00015 of an inch. Opening a disk in 
normal conditions can result in a degree of contamination that will 
eventually result in drive failure. 
                                                          
45 Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence, 
http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence.pdf  
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Chemical Chemical A disk operating in a humid atmosphere may experience some 
deterioration in the electrical connectors between the circuit board on the 
disk 
Electrical  
 
Surge/ 
Component 
failure 
Damage to voice coil, spindle motor can occur as a result of power surges.  
 
Firmware/ 
Service area 
Failure Corruption of the firmware area may result due to incorrect storage but 
can also result due to the age of the device. It may also occur during disk 
use as firmware commands/modules corrupt the device 
 
Table 1: Disk Failure 
 
It should also be noted that some of the faults discussed above may arise as a result of malicious user activity or 
could also be the result of wear and tear on the disks.  
 
FAULTY DRIVES PURCHASED IN THE 2008 DISK STUDY 
 
The disks that were purchased as part of the disk study and that arrived in a faulty state could be as a result of 
three possibilities, each of which has a potential impact as to whether data had been removed from the drive: 
 
1) The disk was sold in a working state and damaged in transit as a result of some form of kinetic shock. 
In this case the disks may or may not have had data removed. 
2) The disk was knowingly sold in a faulty state after suffering some form of mechanical or electrical 
failure. In this case it is likely the user would not have had the opportunity to remove data from the 
disk. 
3) The disk failed during its last use by the previous owner and was sold unknowingly in a faulty state. In 
this case the disks may or may not have had data removed. 
 
Although the third option is a possibility, based on the number of drives faulty in the disk studies and the number 
of reliable power on / power off cycles, it is considered more likely that either the disks were damaged in transit 
or failed prior to being offered for sale. Most hard disks in a powered down and parked state are able to 
withstand a degree of mechanical shock. Although it should be noted that a number of disks that were obtained 
for the study were inadequately packaged when shipped from their previous owner.  We therefore suggest that 
that it is reasonable to conclude that the majority of disks are most likely to fall into the second category those 
disks that have been knowingly sold in a faulty or failed state. If this is the case then the owners are unlikely to 
have had the opportunity to remove their data from the disk. A seller may be of the opinion that if they are 
unable to access the contents of a drive then neither can anyone else.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
Based on these assumptions we suggest that comparing the sample of faulty drives in the disk study to those of 
the working disks; overall the faulty drives are more likely to contain user data and that provided the drives can 
be returned to a working state this data can probably be accessed. 
 
HARD DISK FAILURE 
 
A disk was considered faulty if the drive failed to spin up normally and present itself as a working disk to FTK 
imager, therefore resulting in it being not possible to access the disks using normal forensic tools. The disks 
when powered up for analysis and connected to a write-blocker displayed a variety of symptoms varying from 
spinning up (based on slight vibrations and an audible check), in some a rhythmic clicking of the disk heads, 
others produced no activity suggesting some form of electrical failure.  
 
In one example, a disk from the 2008 disk study (07GB053) was reported as making an electronic pinging noise, 
similar to early ‘space invaders’ games when powered on. A visual inspection of the exterior of the disk revealed 
a slight dent in the upper cover in the area where the disk head traversed the platters of the disk. The disk was 
opened and it was determined that the read/write head was located in the centre of the platter rather than in the 
‘parked’ position. As a result the depression in the outer case had resulted in one of the read/write heads 
becoming wedged on the disk surface.  When power was supplied to the disk and it attempted to carry out the 
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initial read / seek this resulted in the voice coil46 causing the pinging sound. The disk platters were manually 
rotated and the head moved back to the parked position. The disk was then powered on and after a single ‘ping’ 
the normal start up ‘seek’ sequence was performed with the heads travelling across the surface of he platter as 
normal.  
 
However, subsequent attempts to recover data from the disk failed as it did not present itself as ready to 
accept/process ATA commands. The conclusion was that either the delicate read/write head mechanism had 
been damaged in some way as a result of it being forced down onto the surface of the platter, or that the disk 
spindle /platters had been distorted, although there was no visible damage to either the platters or disk heads.  
 
A laser pointer was used to check for distortion on the platters. The resulting elliptical path of the reflected laser 
beam suggested that the spindle hand been bent out of place and that this disk could only be recovered by 
relocating the disk platters into a new chassis, assuming the platter themselves had not been damaged. In this 
study, due to the difficulty in obtaining matching donor parts and to provide an idea of the capability of a user 
with access to only the equipment, repairs type 1 and 2 (Table 2) were applied so no further work was carried out 
on this disk.  
 
It was determined that the faulty disks examined in the study could be divided into four classes in terms of the 
possible disk repair and data recovery, based on the skills and technology required.  
 
 
Type Repair 
1 A simple mechanical fix, requiring no specialist tools or donor parts. Typically this would be 
resetting the disk head / parking the disk head / PCB repair. 
2 Recovery using specialist tools either to image a failing disk drive or to repair disk firmware. 
3 A complex mechanical fix requiring the use of donor parts to replace or rebuild faulty mechanical 
components of the disk. 
4 No repairs possible 
 
Table 2: Disk Repair 
 
FAILED DISK ANALYSIS 
 
The disks that did not image in the 2008 study were separated into SCSI and IDE drives, with the recovery tools 
available, this study focussed on the IDE drives which provide a sample size of 32 hard disks. The 32 faulty IDE 
disks were examined and none of the drives were determined to be type 1 drives, rather 10 drives (31% of the 
IDE disks) were identified as being type 2 and 20 (63%) drives were identified as being type 3 drives, requiring 
donor parts to return them to an operational state. Only 2 (6%) disk drives were judged to be irreparable, the 
pinging disk (07GB053) discussed above and one other disk drive which had undergone a head-crash which had 
caused significant damage to the disk platters.   
 
The 10 type 2 drives were further analysed to determine the degree of data, if possible, that could be extracted 
from the disk drives.  A more detailed analysis indicated that 3 (9%) of the disks were either partially supported 
by the recovery equipment and so could not be analysed further. The 7 disks (22%) that disks that could be 
repaired displayed two main problems: Either the need for a specialised interface and jumper requirements (4 
disks) or varying degrees of firmware corruption (3 disks).  
 
Restored Disk Results 
 
Once the drives had been restored to enable access to the drive contents it was possible to determine that 2 of the 
7 (29% of the restored disks) were wiped and that the remaining 5 (71% of the restored disks) contained varying 
degrees of data. This is in comparison to the 2008 disk study results where 31% of the readable disks were wiped 
and 69% contained data.  
 
The data recovered from the restored drives included music, password files, surfing histories and for one 
company; financial contracts, work proposals, client details, email and attachments. Overall the results are 
broadly similar to the analysis of working disks in the 2008 study, but the sample size of 7 restored disks is very 
                                                          
46 In a modern hard disk, the actuator uses a device called a voice coil to move the read/write head arms back and forward 
across the surface of the platters. The voice coil is operated by using electromagnetic attraction and repulsion. 
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small. Therefore future work will focus on the restoration of drives classed as type 3 (requiring spare parts) to 
determine if this makes a significant difference to the number of drives containing data. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The implications of this work suggest that disks that are found to be faulty and which fail to spin up or cannot be 
recognised by the operating system may not be truly ‘dead’. A significant number of these disks can be restored 
and users with access to the appropriate tools and technology can then recover the data with relative ease. Many 
forensic investigators already utilise data recovery tools to recover potential evidence, however there may be 
other users with less honourable intentions. 
 
Although the majority of the specialist tools described in this paper can be acquired for between a few hundred 
and a few thousand pounds, in terms of the threat vectors it is more likely to be commercial competitors from a 
large organisation, or nation states engaged in commercial espionage and is less likely to be from private 
individuals due to the cost and time involved in some of the recovery techniques. 
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